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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw- Undocumented Alien Children, Equal
Protection, and "Special Constitutional Sensitivity"- Plyler v. Doe,
457 U. S. 202 (1982).
INTRODUcTION
The number of undocumented aliens' in the United States has
been estimated to range from as low as 3.5 to 6 million,2 to as
high as 6 to 10 million.' The nature of the clandestine population
of undocumented aliens makes estimates speculative.' A conser-
vative estimate of 2.7 million undocumented Mexicans are living
in the United States.' Generally, the undocumented aliens enter
the United States in search of economic opportunities.6 The vast
border between the United States and Mexico represents "a
permeable membrane that joins rather than separates the two
nations "'7 leaving the ingress of the undocumented Mexicans vir-
tually unobstructed. The availability of jobs requiring unskilled
labor in the Southwest, along with the lack of any federal legislative
mandates prohibiting the employment of undocumented aliens,8
fulfills the expectations of Mexican entrants.
The sheer number and nature of the undocumented alien
1. An alien is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(3)
(1982). Although § 1101 does not define either "undocumented" or "illegal," this status is the
result of the entrance of the alien into the United States without obtaining the proper documenta-
tion required to meet the criteria of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1181-85 (1982). An alien within the United States in violation of the INA is subject to criminal
proceedings (the first conviction is a misdemeanor; subsequent convictions are felonies), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325 (1982), and deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). Criminal and deportation actions are
subject to judicial review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982). Therefore, this casenote will use the term
'undocumented alien" rather than the conclus'ionary term "illegal alien."
2. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., IST SESS.,
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 36 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Select Commission Report].
3. Getting Their Slice of ParadiseTIME, May 2, 1977, at 26. Chief Justice Burger recog-
nized an estimate of 12 million undocumented aliens in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
899 n.1 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
4. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.
1980), affd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
5. Id.
6. Id. The primary reason for the migration, legal as well as illegal, is the chance to leave
an under-employed country to come to the United States where the chance of employment at higher
wages is greater. Studies tend to show that although undocumented workers receive relatively
low wages by United States standards, the wages are significantly higher than the wages in the
country the worker left. Select Commission Report, supra note 2, at 37.
7. Kane & Velarde-Munoz, Undocumented Aliens and the Constitution: Limitations on State
Action Denying Undocumented Children Access to Public Education, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
461, 465 (1978).
8. Select Commission Report, supra note 2, at 61 ..The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, which propos-
ed amnesty for undocumented aliens currently residing in the United States and fines for employers
hiring future illegal entrants, failed in the 97th Congress. Further proposals for such legislation
must overcome several special-interest lobbyists that benefit from the cheap labor, as well as the
Hispanics themselves, A Little Terrifying, TIME, January 17, 1983, at 10.
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population has provoked public concern 9 and conflicting views as
to the resolution of the situation. One school of thought is that
the United States should adopt an expanded immigration policy
based upon both humanitarian principles and the need for a larger
work force to fill the employment needs for the decades ahead."0
On the other hand, some argue that the immigration policy should
be contracted because of the burden on social services,"1 job
displacement, " wage depression," and the general effects on United
States law and society.14
In response to the dilemma created by the undocumented
population, California enacted a statute that made employment of
undocumented aliens illegal, when such employment acted to the
detriment of resident aliens or United States citizens."5 Texas, while
not explicitly seeking to curb the influx of undocumented aliens,"
9. Based upon testimony at Commission hearings, it was concluded that "[tihe message is
clear-most U.S. citizens believe that the half-open door of undocumented/illegal migration should
be closed." Select Commission Report, supra note 2, at 35.
10. Select Commission Report, supra note 2, at 7-8. The latter argument may be refuted,
however, considering the problems of unemployment this nation faces.
11. Select Commission Report, supra note 2, at 38. In recent years, however, it has been
recognized that undocumented aliens are not a drain on social services. In fact, the undocumented
population contributes to the tax base via payroll withholding and consumer taxes, and to proper-
ty taxes through rent. Id. At the same time, the undocumented aliens underutilize social programs
due to fear of detection and deportation and lack of a welfare tradition in the home country. Doe
v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 578 (E. D. Tex. 1978), affd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), affd,
457 U.S. 202 (1982). While the direct social costs may be low, however, the overall cost is rais-
ed somewhat by the displacement of legal residents from jobs, forcing them to draw upon social
welfare programs. Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public Policy Alternatives, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63, 67 (1977).
12. There is no consensus among the authorities as to the effect of undocumented aliens on
the labor force. While some contend that the undocumented worker directly competes with the
economically disadvantaged, lawfully residing minorities, others insist that the undocumented worker
fills a void by taking jobs that citizens do not want, thereby keeping industries from moving out-
side of the United States for labor and thus creating further employment opportunities for U. S.
citizens. Select Commision Report, supra note 2, at 39-40. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service estimated that in 1975 undocumented aliens held one million jobs which could have gone
to legal residents. Getting Their Slice of Paradise, TiME, May 2, 1977, at 30.
13. The Select Commission concluded that, although not quantifiable, "it is apparent that the
continuing flow of undocumented workers across U.S. borders has certainly contributed to the
displacement of some U.S. workers and the depression of some U.S. wages." Select Commission
Report, supra note 2, at 41. See also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976).
14. The large number of undocumented aliens in the workforce has led to a disregard not only
for the immigration laws but also for laws regarding minimum wages and occupational safety. Select
Commission Report, supra note 2, at 42. See also, Note, To Educate or Not to Educate: The Plight
of Undocumented Alien Children in Texas, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 119, 123 n.14 (1982).
15. CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 2805(a) (West 1971). The statute was challenged on preemption
grounds by farm labor contractors after they had been convicted for employing undocumented aliens.
The Supreme Court upheld the statute in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). The Select Com-
mission recognized that in order to solve any of the problems created by the undocumented alien
population, the first requirement would be to enact federal legislation prohibiting the employment
of undocumented aliens. Select Commission Report, supra note 2, at 61.
16. Indeed, the undocumented workers have been encouraged in some locales. "[O]ur society
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passed legislation aimed at one of the consequences of the presence
of the undocumented population.17 The statute gave the local school
districts authority to deny undocumented aliens free public educa-
tion. In so doing the Texas legislature created a unique subclass
that was denied one of the most important governmental functions. 8
This legislation was overturned by the U. S. Supreme Court in
Plyler v. Doe.9
This Note explores the constitutional issues raised by the Texas
legislative classification in the context of an equal protection
challenge, and also analyzes the ultimate resolution of the issue
by the United States Supreme Court in light of prior equal protec-
tion challenges dealing with alienage, education, and, because of
a unique analogy drawn by the Supreme Court in Plyler,
illegitimacy.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LITIGATION IN THE STATE,
DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS
Prior to 1975, undocumented alien school children were
generally admitted into the public schools of Texas. 2-At the re-
quest of the Commission of Education, the Attorney General of
Texas issued an opinion stating that Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031
permitted all children, those legally admitted as well as those il-
legally present, free public education if certain residence re-
quirements were met.2 The Texas legislature amended § 21.031
in May, 1975, explicitly stating that free public education was limited
only to United States citizens and legally admitted aliens.22 Con-
has participated in the creation of the problem. Many undocumented/illegal migrants were induced
to come to the United States by offers of work from U.S. employers who recruited and hired them
under the protection of present U.S. law.' Select Commission Report, supra note 2, at 12.
17. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981). See also, In Re Alien Children Educa-
tion Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
18. In Re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affid,
457 U.S. 202 (1982). See generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
19. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
20. In Re Alien Children Litigation, 501 F Supp. 544, 554 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd, 457 U.S.
202 (1982).
21. Id.
22. The pertinent subsections of TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981) provide:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens who
are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day of
September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available
School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admit-
ted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years
on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be per-
mitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in which
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sequently, the local school districts were given the discretion to
completely deny admission to undocumented aliens, admit them
upon a tuition payment, or continue to educate them without
tuition. 3
Actions were commenced in state2" and federal courts2 con-
testing the constitutionality of § 21.031 as amended. The Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas upheld § 21.031 against an equal pro-
tection challenge. The state court applied the rational relation-
ship test after concluding that the statute did not create a suspect
class or impinge on a fundamental right 7.2  The court held that the
statute was to be presumed constitutional as social and economic
legislation, and that it rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. "8 The Texas Supreme Court refused to hear the case with
the notation "no reversible error "
In contrast, § 21.031 failed an equal protection challenge in
Federal District Court actions in both Doe v. Plyler ° and In Re
Alien Children Education Litigation.1 Although the judge in Doe
v. Plyler could not fit the facts of the case into any of the factual
situations where the U. S. Supreme Court had exercised strict
scrutiny, he seemingly employed a heightened level of review by
finding that the classification did not meet the criterion of rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.3 2 Further, the District
Court concluded that § 21.031 was void because it conflicted with
federal authority in the area of immigration and naturalization. 3
The District Court in In Re Alien Children Education Litiga-
his parent, guardian or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time
he applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit
into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either
citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and
not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or
his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.
23. In Re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 E Supp. 544, 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd,
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
24. Hernandez v. Houston Independent School District, 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
25. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 628 F2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), affd,
457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 E Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
affd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Boe v. Wright, No. 3-79-0440-D (N.D. Tex., Sept. 11, 1980), affd,
648 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1981).
26. Hernandez v. Houston Independent School District, 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
27. Id. at 124. See section II for a discussion of suspect class and fundamental rights.
28. Id.
29. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Tex. 1980), affd, 628 E2d 448 (5th Cir.
1980), affid, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
30. Id.
31. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
32. 458 F. Supp. at 585.
33. Id. at 592.
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tion found §21.031 unconstitutional on different grounds. The court
found that the absolute deprivation of education created by §21.031
was subject to strict scrutiny.' Accordingly, the state did not meet
the burden of justifying the deprivation by showing a compelling
state interest to justify the classification." Additionally, the court
in In Re Alien Children Education Litigation differed from the court
in Doe v. Plyler by finding that §21.031 was not pre-empted by
federal legislation. 6
A three judge panel 7 of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed Doe v. Plyler. 8 The District Court decision was affirmed
with the Court of Appeals essentially agreeing with the lower
court's equal protection analysis. 9 However, the appellate court
held that § 21.031 was not pre-empted by federal legislation." °
Litigation from the Northern District of Texas enjoining the
Dallas Independent School District from refusing to admit un-
documented aliens in public schools was reviewed by the Fifth
Circuit in Boe v. Wright.' A different three judge panel 42 sitting
in Boe v. Wright affirmed the granting of the preliminary injunc-
tion based on the holding of Doe v. Plyler. 3 However, two of the
judges filed specially concurring opinions disagreeing with the
result reached in Doe v. Plyler." The disagreement centered on
34. 501 F. Supp. at 564.
35. Id. at 582-84. Although this finding was dispositive, the court further concluded that the
statute would not survive the rational basis test since "the state has not shown that the classifica-
tion used actually advances the state interest" Id. at 583.
36. Id. at 588. See Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 140 (1982),
for an argument in support of deciding the issue on the principle of preemption. The article also
asserts that political question abstention could have been invoked to achieve a substantive judg-
ment by passive means. However, the so-called doctrines of nonjusticiability should be reserved
for issues that are truly nonjusticiable, and not as an escape hatch to decide complex substantive
issues. A bona fide effort by the court to analyze the substantive issues in the proper context is
necessary to provide the framework for equal protection models as well as preserve the integrity
of the concept of judicial review.
37. The panel consisted of Dyer, Frank M. Johnson, Jr., and Politz, Circuit Judges, See Doe
v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1980).
38. 628 F.2d 448.
39. Id. 458.
40. Id. 454.
41. Boe v. Wright, 648 F2d 432 (5th Cir. 1980). The District Court had originally refused the
motion by the plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction, but granted the injunction after Justice Powell
decided in Certain Named and Un-named Non-Citizen Children and Their Parents v. Texas, 448
U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1980) to vacate the stay issued by the Fifth Circuit pending ap-
peal of the injunction issued in In Re Alien Children Litigation. Id. at 433.
42. Chief Judge Charles Clark, Reavley, J. and Williams, J. sat on the panel.
43. Judge Reavley states, "Absent some intervening contrary authority from the Supreme Court
or this court sitting en banc, I am bound to follow the decision in Doe v. Plyler. . " Boe v.
Wright, 648 F.2d at 434.
44. Boe v. Wright, 648 F.2d at 434-41.
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whether the classification under § 21.031 rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."5 The two specially concurring judges
found adequate rational interests to support the classification."
The Fifth Circuit also summarily affirmed In Re Alien Children
Education Litigation on the authority of Doe v. Plyler, and the
two cases were consolidated for review before the Supreme Court. 7
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that § 21.031
created a unique and complex situation in the realm of equal pro-
tection analysis. The reality of the undocumented Mexicans' con-
tinuing presence in Texas conflicted with the Congressional in-
tent to.bar such persons from the country. 8 However, the lax en-
forcement of the immigration and nationality laws, along with the
absence of provisions to discourage the employment of un-
documented workers, 9 made clear that the federal intent to con-
trol the influx of undocumented aliens is presently but an abstract
theory. This further frustrates the issue, and the state, district and
circuit court decisions reflect the conflict between law in theory
versus situation in fact."
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The traditional role of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment"l has been to protect individuals from legisla-
tion that invidiously discriminates against a class of people or im-
45. Id. at 434. In Doe v. Plyler, the court held that while strict scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review, it need not apply that standard since there was no rational basis for the classifica-
tion. 628 F.2d at 458.
46. 628 F.2d at 438.
47. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
48. See supra note 1.
49. See supra note 8.
50. This conflict has been addressed in numerous law review articles as the litigation of § 21.031
has progressed through the courts. See e.g. Note, To Educate or Not to Educate: The Right of
Undocumented Alien Children in Texas, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 119 (1982); Note, Undocumented Aliens
and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of Doe v. Plyler, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 43 (1981);
Note, Undocumented Aliens-Equal Protection and the Right to a Free Public Education: Doe
v. Plyler, 33 ALA. L. REV. 181 (1981); Comment, Does the Constitution Guarantee a Free Public
Education to Undocumented Alien Children? 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 637 (1981); Comment, Equal Pro-
tection and Educating Illegal Alien Children, 11 STETSON L. REv. 499 (1981); Note, A State Statute
Which Denies an Education to Undocumented Aliens is Unconstitutional -Doe v. Plyler, 14 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 289 (1979); Note, Charge of Tuition to Illegal Alien School Children Pursuant to Texas
Statute Violates Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 549 (1979); Note, Texas Statute's Denial
of Free Public Education to Illegal Aliens Violates Equal Protection Clause and is Preempted by
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 12 VAND. J. TRtANSNAT'L L. 787 (1979); Comment, Un-
documented Aliens: Education, Employment and Welfare in the United States and in New Mexico,
9 N.M.L.REv. 99 (1978); Kane and Munoz, Undocumented Aliens and the Constitution: Limita-
tions on State Action Denying Undocumented Access to Public Education, 5 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 461 (1978).
51. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws: U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
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pinges on the exercise of a fundamental right.5 " If legislation is
aimed at merely social or economic issues, the court uses the
deferential "rational basis" test." However, if a "suspect class" is
created by invidious discrimination, or a "fundamental right" is
infringed upon, the court invokes strict scrutiny analysis."4 Tradi-
tionally, this two-tiered test has resulted in upholding virtually all
legislation challenged in the socio-economic area, and overturn-
ing practically all legislation that has created a suspect class or
impinged upon a fundamental right." The difficulty lies in ascer-
taining when a suspect class has been created and when a fun-
damental right is implicated. To provide a meaningful level of
review without classifying discrimination as suspect and impor-
tant rights as fundamental, the Court has exercised a "heighten-
ed" level of scrutiny without recognizing a middle tier or third
standard until very recently. 6
The relevant equal protection issues created by § 21.031 are
whether a suspect class is created based upon a subclass of alienage
or wealth; whether education is a fundamental right; and if no
suspect class is created and education is not a fundamental interest,
whether the intermediate scrutiny test is warranted or merely the
deferential rational basis test. The historical background of each
issue will be analyzed to obtain a perspective for reviewing the
decision in Plyler v. Doe.
SUSPECr CLASS
A. Alienage Classifications
Prior to 1948, classifications based upon alienage were upheld
if the classification was shown to relate to a "special public
interest." In 1948, with the decisions of Oyama v. California8
52. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA AND YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 518 (1978).
53. Dandridge v. Wiliams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61 (1911). Cf U.S. Dep't. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); U.S. Dep't. of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food stamp exclusions overturned).
54. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. The strict scrutiny has been described as " 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," while the
socioeconomic legislation invokes only "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."
Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
56. The intermediate level of scrutiny was given explicit recognition in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 218 n.16 (1982); See Gunther, supra note 55, at 5; Comment, The Mandate for a New Equal
Protection Model, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 558, 560-61 (1975).
57. NOWAK, ROTUNDA, AND YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978). This
special public interest doctrine resulted in denying aliens rights in "use of natural resources, owner-
ship of land, and employment." Id.
58. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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amd Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,"' the Supreme Court
took significant steps toward enlarging the rights of lawful aliens.
These decisions showed a trend away from the "special public in-
terest" doctrine by overturning state provisions restricting alien
ownership of land"0 and employment.6" No other action was taken
by the Supreme Court in matters involving alienage classifications
until the decision of Graham v. Richardson 6 in 1971.6
Lawfully admitted aliens were first recognized as a suspect
class in Graham v. Richardson," where the Court overturned state
statutes that conditioned resident alien welfare benefits on a residen-
cy requirement." Although the Court equated classifications based
on alienage to those based on race in Graham, subsequent deci-
sions have shown that alienage is not per se suspect as are racial
classifications.' Indeed, Justice Powell has conceded that "the deci-
sions of this Court regarding the permissibility of statutory
classifications involving aliens have not formed an unwavering line
over the years."
In Mathews v. Diaz" a federal statute that required aliens to
have resided in the United States for five years and to have been
admitted for permanent residence in order to qualify for certain
medicare benefits was upheld by the Court. 9 This unanimous deci-
sion stands out among those subsequent to Graham in two respects.
First, it established a federal-state dichotomy in dealing with
alienage, and second, it explicitly recognized nonpolitical distinc-
tions between citizens and non-citizens. The Court based its
deferential treatment of the federal regulation on the constitutional
provision that grants to Congress the exclusive power to regulate
immigration and nationality."° Further, such reasoning equates the
control over aliens to a "political question, which goes beyond
59. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
60. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
61. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
62. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
63. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA, AND YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 596 (1978).
64. 403 U.S. 365, 372. "[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."
65. Id. at 376. The Graham rationale was used to overturn alienage classifications in Nyquist
v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); In
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). See also Hamp-
ton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
67. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72 (1979).
68. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
69. Id. at 87.
70. id, at 81. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Seealso Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
71. Id. at 82.
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deference and approaches abdication.72 Because the Constitution
gives Congress exclusive control over immigration and nationali-
ty, the Court notes that equal protection analysis between aliens
and states as opposed to aliens and the federal government "in-
volves significantly different considerations."73 However, since the
classification of alienage under review in Mathews was not a result
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but was welfare legisla-
tion dealing with medicare eligibility,7 ' the dichotomy based on
congressional power over immigration and naturalization was
somewhat undermined.7" This argument is supported by Hamp-
ton v. Mow Sun Wong,76 where the issue was the constitutionality
of a federal civil service regulation which barred resident aliens
from employment in the federal competitive civil service. The
Court recognized that the federal classification of aliens was "sub-
ject only to narrow judicial review"77 but found that the classifica-
tion did not relate to the congressional objective controlling im-
migration and nationalization. Therefore, this classification fail-
ed even the relaxed standard of review.78
The second element of Mathews, the broad distinction of rights
between citizens and non-citizens, was eyident when the Court
stated that "the fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens different-
ly from citizens does not in itself imply that such disparate treat-
72. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
73. 426 U.S. 67, 84, 85 (1976). The Court further states, "Contrary to appellees' characteriza-
tion, it is not 'political hypocrisy' to recognize that the fourteenth amendment's limits on state
powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power
over immigration and naturalization." Id. at 86, 87. In Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977),
a state statute was invalidated that conditioned educational financial aid to aliens upon the alien
expressing an intent to become a U.S. citizen. Justice Blackmun attempted to distinguish Mathews
by stating that the federal government "enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not shared
by the states, because of the broad congressional power over immigration and naturalization."
Id. at 8 n.l.
74. Ironically, the statute in Graham was found to have been preempted by federal legisla-
tion, but with a similar fact situation, the federal regulation was upheld in Mathews. This seems
to be inconsistent with DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), where the Court held that the
federal policy must explicitly restrict legislation to the federal level, or the state law must con-
tradict the federal law to find preemption. Apparently, this flaw in logic was recognized by the
Court, because on subsequent challenges involving both the equal protection clause and preemp-
tion, the equal protection analysis has been dispositive and therefore the preemption issue has
not been addressed.
75. See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 1023, 1062 (1979).
76. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
77. Id. at 101 -102 n.21.
78. Id. at 116. It should be noted that Hampton was a 5-4 decision, while Mathews, decided
the same day, was unanimous. After the Hampton decision, President Ford issued an executive
order which barred some non-citizens federal civil service employment. The constitutionality of
the executive order was upheld when the district court reviewed Hampton on remand. 435 F.
Supp. 37, 42-46 (N.D. Cal. 1977), noted in ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 584 (1981).
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ment is invidious"79 and "it is unquestionably reasonable for
Congress to make an alien's eligibility depend on both the character
and the duration of his residence."8 These statements seem to con-
tradict the purpose of designating aliens a suspect class to afford
them a meaningful level of review under equal protection
challenges.
Foley v. Connelie81 and Ambach v. Norwick82 are exceptions
to the strict scrutiny of alien classifications at the state and local
level. In Foley, a resident alien challenged New York's prohibi-
tion of aliens from the state police force. 3 Justice Burger, writing
for the majority, upheld the statute. His primary support was the
case of Sugarman v. Dougall,84 which overturned a state restric-
tion on the employment of lawful aliens in the state civil service.
Although Dougall eventually held consistent with the treatment
of alienage classifications as suspect, in dicta it provided a basis
for the states to exclude aliens in the governmental function. State
troopers, Chief Justice Burger reasoned, are an integral part of
the governmental function because they have power to make
arrests.8 Although this argument may have some validity, another
apparent reason for the outcome may have been an overall change
of perspective by the members of the Court. Justice Stewart, in
concurring with the majority in Foley, stated: "It is only because
I have become increasingly doubtful about the validity of those
decisions [regarding alienage] (in at least some of which I con-
curred) that I join the opinion of the Court in this case "87
Another New York alienage classification passed constitutional
muster in Ambach v. Norwick. 88 This case involved a requirement
that public school teachers must be citizens, and once again the
governmental function doctrine announced in Dougall was
invoked. 9 Justice Powell, writing for a majority of five, suggested
that the function of the teacher in public schools is so important
in developing the student's civic and governmental attitudes, that
79. 426 U.S. at 80.
80. Id. at 82, 83.
81. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
82. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
83. 435 U.S. at 292.
84. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
85. Id. at 647.
86. 435 U.S. at 298.
87. Id. at 300 (Stewart, J., concurring).
88. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
89. Id. at 74.
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only a citizen could be qualified for the job."0 The Court concluded
that the role of public school teachers "goes to the heart of represen-
tative government." 1
Therefore, it appears that the Court has reverted to the pre-
Oyama, Takahashi rationale in allowing some alienage classifica-
tions to stand based upon a special, though nebulous, governmental
function concept. Mathews, Foley, and Ambach have weakened
the credibility of alienage as a suspect class, and in fact, the "not
unwavering line" suggests the illusory nature of the constitutional
mandates the Court has espoused in reviewing alienage
classifications.
B. Wealth Classification
As noted previously,9" § 21.031 gave the local school districts
the option of providing education to the undocumented children
upon the payment of tuition." Accordingly, this requirement ef-
fectively denied education to the class of undocumented children
because of the poverty of the Mexican migrants.9" This absolute
denial raised the question of whether § 21.031 created a wealth
classification invoking strict scrutiny.
In Griffin v. Illinois" the Court held that the equal protection
clause was violated when a criminal defendant was denied a
transcript of the trial court record because the defendant was unable
to purchase it. Although the Court did not mention "suspect class,"
it is clear that the strictest level of scrutiny was being employed.
The Court stated, "In criminal trials a state can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion,
race or color." ' However, in Douglas v. California97 it was made
clear that only an absolute denial of the benefit sought will war-
rant strict scrutiny.
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections98 explicitly held
that to invoke strict scrutiny, a fundamental right must be the ob-
90. Id. at 78,79. The dissenting opinion correctly pointed out that the terms of the challenged
statute refuted this argument, e.g., aliens may teach with special permission of the commissioner
and there is no citizenship qualification for private schools. Id. at 86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 76, quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
92. See supra casenote text accompaning footnote 23.
93. In Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Tex. 1980) the defendant, Tyler Indepen-
dent School District, set the tuition for undocumented aliens at $1,000.00 per year.
94. Id. at 569, 580-81.
95. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
96. Id. at 17. See also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235 (1970) (indigent defendants could not be incarcerated because of inability to pay a fine); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (equal protection is denied when indigent criminal defendants
are not provided counsel on appeal).
97. 362 U.S. 353 (1963),
98. 383 U.S 663 (1966).
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ject of the wealth related deprivation. Noting that the right to vote
is fundamental, the Court found that this right could not be denied
by the inability to pay a poll tax. 99
The wealth classification was the subject of an equal protec-
tion challenge in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.0 0 The plaintiff argued that the Texas school finance
system, which is based in part upon funding through local prop-
erty taxes, created an improper classification due to the disparity
of the funds available to the different school districts." 1 The Court
found, consistent with prior decisions, that there was no absolute
deprivation, only relative deprivation, and such deprivation of
public education did not impinge on a fundamental right.'
However, the opinion included a footnote indicating that if the
denial of education was absolute, such as may be the case if the
right to education is conditioned upon a tuition payment, the "case
would present a far more compelling set of circumstances for
judicial assistance . 103 This footnote provided considerable
basis for the District Courts in Doe v. Plyler and In Re Alien
Children Education Litigation to find a suspect class based upon
inability to pay the required tuition. " Indeed, it would appear that
the footnote was tailored for such a situation except for the un-
documented status of the children.
EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The concept of education as a constitutionally protected fun-
damental right had its origins in Serrano v. Priest in 1971."'s Califor-
99. Id. at 670. The Court in Harper did not classify indigents as suspect, but it made clear
that such discrimination was invidious. "Wealth, like race, creed or color, is not germane to one's
ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or
property like those of race are traditionally disfavored." Id. at 668.
100. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
101. Id. at 4, 5.
102. Id. at 23, 35.
103. Id. at 25, n.60. This also implies that education could be deemed a fundamental right,
since precedent requires that both the defined class of poor coupled with the denial of a fundamental
right are necessary to invoke a meaningful level of review.
104. In referring to the footnote, the court in Doe v. Plyler asserted, "Indeed, the opinion is
conspicuous in its efforts not to foreclose strict scrutiny in response to constitutional challenges
to absolute deprivation of education opportunity." 458 F. Supp. at 580. The court in In Re Alien
Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. at 555 stated that "Justice Powell reserved the ques-
tion whether absolute deprivation of educational opportunity might require strict judicial scrutiny.
This case squarely presents the issue reserved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez: What
level of scrutiny should be applied when a statute absolutely deprives educational opportunitites
to some children within the state's jurisdiction?"
105. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241,96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Prior to Serrano, similar challenges
of school finance systems were held not violative of the equal protection clause. Burrus v. Wilkerson,
310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), affd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293
F. Supp. 327 (N.D. II1. 1968), affd mem. sub. nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
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nia school children brought an action in the state court claiming
the method of financing public schools in California, which relied
heavily on local property taxes, created wide disparities in funds
available to the different school districts, and therefore created im-
permissible classifications based upon wealth. 0 6 The California
Supreme Court overruled the trial court's grant of a demurrer and
found that the finance scheme violated the equal protection
clause.0 7 In so doing, the court noted that the precedent set by
the United States Supreme Court required a wealth-related
classification that involved a fundamental right.1"8 After finding
that the financing scheme invidiously discriminated against the
poor, the California Supreme Court held that education was a fun-
damental right.0 9 Although the court conceded that there was no
direct authority that held education to be a fundamental right, it
cited Brown v. Board of Education"' to indicate that public educa-
tion has received special treatment from the United States Supreme
Court."' Furthermore, the court compared education to the fun-
damental right of voting in that "both are crucial to participation
in, and the functioning of, a democracy."112
The rationale of Serrano was immediately followed in state
courts"' as well as federal district courts." ' Several commentators,
however, noted that the "abstract egalitarian philosophy" ' of the
decision was analytically unsound.1 Primarily these commentators
cited Dandridge v. Williams..7 and James v. Valtierra"8 as sup-
port for their positions. In Dandridge, the United States Supreme
Court found that limiting welfare payments to a maximum amount,
106. 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1971).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1255.
109. Id. at 1258. "We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of education
in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a fundamental interest." Id.
110. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
111. 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (1971).
112. Id. at 1258.
113. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972); Horton v. Miskill, 376 A.2d
359 (Conn. 1977). But see, Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976).
114. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Tex. 1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1970).
115. Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano
v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504, 534-41 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Golds-
tein, Critical Analysis).
116. See, e.g., Goldstein, Critical Analysis, supra note 115; Vieira, Unequal Education Ex-
penditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano, 37 Mo. L. REV. 617, 618-24 (1972); Comment,
Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 MIcH. L. REV
1324, 1335-42 (1972).
117. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
118. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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regardless of the size of the family, did not trigger strict scrutiny
even though large families did not receive enough assistance to
meet the state-defined subsistence level. Though the case dealt with
"the most basic needs of impoverished human beings" the Court
refused to intervene because the statute was grounded in social
and economic legislation.11 9 Likewise, in Valtierra the Supreme
Court upheld a California constitutional provision that required
approval of proposed low-renting housing projects by a local
referendum." ' It is analytically difficult to find that education is
a fundamental right with a higher degree of constitutional protec-
tion than subsistence welfare and housing.
While Serrano was on remand to the trial court, the United
States Supreme Court decided San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez." ' The issue in Rodriguez was the same as
in Serrano, and the District Court relied heavily on the rationale
of Serrano in finding the Texas school financing system unconstitu-
tional. 2. The Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, reversed the
holding of the District Court.' In keeping with the Burger Court's
reluctance to expand the list of fundamental rights, 24 Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, declined to find education a constitutional-
ly protected fundamental right. He stated that "the importance of
a service performed by the state does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under
the equal protection clause."" Rather, a fundamental right must
be found as an "explicit or implicit guarantee in the Constitution." 6
The relative deprivation of education created by the Texas financ-
ing scheme, the Court reasoned, did not deprive the persons af-
fected of their ability to participate in the democratic process or
the ability to exercise their first amendment freedoms... 7 Although
it was conceded that the result might be different if the depriva-
119. 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
120. 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971). The Court explicitly stated in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972) that the right to housing is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right. "[T]he
constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every economic and social ill." Id. at 74.
121. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
122. 337 F. Supp. 280, 281 n.1 (1972).
123. 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973).
124. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Margia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that
government employment is not fundamental); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
125. 411 U.S. at 30.
126. Id. at 33.
127. Id. at 37.
128. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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tion was absolute rather than relative," "the equal protection clause
does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.""2 9
Rodriguez placed education on the level of social and economic
concerns of the state, requiring only that the state meet the ra-
tional relationship test under the deferential criteria used by the
Court.' In relating Rodriguez to Plyler v. Doe, it should be noted
that in Rodriguez the Court refused to elevate the case to the in-
termediate scrutiny level, although there was an important, if not
fundamental, right involved, and wealth discrimination, to some
degree, did in fact exist."
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AND ILLEGITIMACY CLASSIFICATIONS
The Burger Court's response to the Warren Court's two-tiered
method of equal protection analysis has been to carve out a stan-
dard of review on a level between the compelling interest test
necessary to survive strict scrutiny and the rational relationship
test of the challenges involving socio-economic legislation."' This
heightened review requires the showing of a substantial relation-
ship to an important interest of the state to justify the classifica-
tion imposed.133
Professor Gunther, in his well-known article on the 1971
Supreme Court term, was one of the first to recognize the middle
level of scrutiny. He noted that the Burger Court would not ex-
pand the fundamental rights theory because it resembled substan-
tive due process and "circumscribed legislative choices in the name
of newly articulated values that lacked clear support in constitu-
tional text and history."" ' Using the decisions of the 1971-72 term,
he formulated a model based upon those equal protection challenges
where the Court overturned legislative classifications without men-
tioning "suspect class" or "fundamental right.' The model as
hypothesized by Professor Gunther would require that the
classification as a means would have to substantially relate to the
129. 411 U.S. at 24.
130. See supra note 57.
131. Justice Marshall, in dissenting, presented what could be termed a "spectrum approach"
to finding the level of scrutiny to be applied to the subject right involved. He stated that the test
is to "determine the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests
not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and
the non-constitutional interest draws closer, the non-constitutional interest becomes more fun-
damental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory
basis must be adjusted accordingly." 411 U.S. at 102-103 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
132. Gunther, supra note 55, at 10-20.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 8.
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legislative ends in order for a legislative classification to be
upheld." '
Cases that have been reviewed under intermediate scrutiny
typically have involved classifications based on gender or il-
legitimacy. As Professor Perry has pointed out, the treatment of
gender-based classifications under the intermediate scrutiny test
may be "more rhetorical than real " 136 In reality, the gender-based
classifications are actually treated on a level parallel to race
classifications." 7 The treatment afforded classifications of il-
legitimates, however, has not been as consistent as the Supreme
Court's disfavor of lines drawn according to gender.
In Labine v. Vincent 3' the Court upheld a state statute that
barred acknowleded illegitimate children from inheritance by in-
testate succession. 39 In so doing, the Court distinguished two prior
cases that invalidated classifications based upon illegitimacy. The
Court noted that in Levy v. Louisiana'. and Glora v. American
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,1' the actions were brought
under the statutory tort claim of wrongful death. Such classifica-
tions created invidious discrimination and could not stand the
heightened level of review, although couched in the rational rela-
tionship test.1"2 However, in Labine, Justice Black concluded that
striking down a classification barring illegitimate children from
recovering under a tort action set no precedent when the issue was
distribution of property.
1 43
Although not explicitly referred to, Labine was in effect over-
ruled by Trimble v. Gordon. 14 In adopting the rationale of Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,145 Trimble overturned a state statute
that allowed illegitimates to inherit by intestate succession only
135. Id. at 20-24.
136. Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLuM. L. REV.
1024, 1055 (1979).
137. See e.g., Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In Hogan,
the Court cited Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) and Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), in holding that the "party seeking to uphold a
statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing
an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification." 458 U.S. at 724.
138. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
139. Id. at 540.
140. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
141. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
142. 401 U.S. at 532, 535-36.
143. Id. at 539. The Court took solace in this opinion by noting that the statute did not intend
to bar illegitimates from inheritance because the property could be passed to the illegitimate via
a properly executed will. Id.
144. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1058 (1978).
145. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). In Weber the Court used the significant interest test synonymous
with intermediate scrutiny to overturn workmen's compensation regulations that denied illegitimate
children recovery of death benefits.
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from the mother.1' The passage quoted in Trimble reflecting the
rationale of Weber states:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation
of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condem-
nation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our legal
system that burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrong doing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing
the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the
parent.' 7
It appeared, based upon Weber and Trimble, that the il-
legitimacy classification had become so disfavored with the Court
that the state's burden of showing a substantial interest to justify
the classification would be practically insurmountable. However,
with the decision of Lalli v. Lalli,4'6 Labine re-entered through the
back door. Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion in both
Weber and Trimble, wrote the plurality opinion in Lalli, joined
only by two other Justices. Justice Powell attempted to distinguish
Trimble in holding that a state statute requiring that an illegitimate
child must have established the identity of his father by a paterni-
ty suit during the lifetime of the father in order to share in the
intestate succession, was substantially related to a legitimate state
interest and did not violate the equal protection clause.49 The con-
curring opinions of Justices Blackmun' and Rehnquist,5 along
with the dissenting opinion,5 ' found Lalli and Trimble constitu-
tionally indistinguishable.
It is indeed difficult to rationalize Labine, Trimble and Lalli.
This difficulty reveals the weaknesses in implementing the model
announced by Professor Gunther, and the relative confusion as
to the correct standard of review to apply. The transient nature
of the Court does not explain the shift in this instance. As previously
noted, Justice Powell wrote all three opinions, and Trimble and
Lalli were decided by identical Courts.
In discussing illegitimacy classifications, two other cases merit
146. 430 U.S. at 776.
147. 406 U.S. at 175.
148. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
149. Id. at 266-68. Justice Powell seemed to think that the evidentiary problem of establishing
parentage justified the requirement that a paternity suit settle the issue. However, as the dissent
correctly noted, those illegitimate children being supported by benevolent fathers are the least
likely to bring a paternity suit, and clearly would have a claim on the father's estate but for the
lack of actual litigation. Id. at 278.
150. Id. at 276-77 (Blackmun, I., concurring). Blackmun did not join in the plurality opinion
because of the "plurality's valiant struggle to distinguish, rather than overrule Trimble. "Id. at 276.
151. Id. at 276 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 277-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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attention: Mathews v. Lucas... and Fiallo v. Bell.' These cases
represent the proposition, mentioned previously, that a difference
exists between the level of review afforded state and federal
classifications. In Lucas, the Court sustained a provision of the
Social Security Act that denied certain illegitimate children sur-
vivor benefits.' 5 Although the Court noted the elevated treatment
of illegitimates, s6 it appeared to view this case as falling within
the socio-economic mode of deferential review. The Court con-
cluded that the "statutory classifications are permissible... because
they are reasonably related" to a legitimate goal. 5 7
Fiallo involved a provision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) that granted preferential treatment to aliens when a
parent and child were separated, one being lawfully in the country.. 8
and the other outside the country seeking entry.'9 The preferen-
tial treatment resulted in allowing the alien outside the country
to enter without regard to quota limitations. However, this special
status was granted to illegitimates only when seeking a reunion
with the mother. 6 ' Therefore, the plaintiff claimed that the statute
created impermissible discrimination based upon both sex and
illegitimacy. 6' In upholding the discrimination, the Court reiterated
"over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress
more complete than it is over" immigration. 6 '
It is difficult to find that the INA regulations would have a
rational interest in the conduct of parents of illegitimate children.
The only possible explanation for such classification is the eviden-
tiary problem of establishing parentage by the father. However,
the Court went no further in its inquiry than finding that the INA
is typically a judicial "handsoff" area. 6" From an analytical stand-
point, it does not seem that invidious discrimination should be
153. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
154. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
155. 427 U.S. at 516.
156. Id. at 505.
157. Id. at 509.
158. The family member inside the country could be either a citizen or legally admitted alien.
See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 789.
159. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 787.
160. Id. at 789.
161. Id. at 791.
162. Id. at 792 (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Strahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
163. In the holding the Court placed the INA on a pedestal above the reach of the equal protec-
tion guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, and was inconsistent with the theory underlying the
decision of Trimble, decided the same day. The Court noted that the judiciary traditionally defers
to legislative intent over immigration and naturalization. This historically based deference is also
inconsistent with a statement by Justice Douglas in Levy v. Louisiana, "[we] have been extremely
sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights ...and have not hesitated to strike down an in-
vidious classification even though it had history and tradition on its side." 391 U.S. at 71.
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subject to judicial abdication merely because Congress has ex-
clusive control over the regulation of immigration and
naturalization.
The decision dealing with illegitimacy classifications, like the
decisions regarding alienage classifications, do not appear to be
analytically consistent. The intermediate scrutiny test may often
result in most of the Justices' employing the same test,"' but ar-
riving at different results. This suggests that when the text of the
Constitution is not the guiding beacon for the Justices, but rather
their personal philosophies, the results tend to be analytically
unsound.
ANALYSIS OF PLYLER v. DOE
But it hardly can be argued rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within
our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons, many of whom will remain in the
states, adding to the problems and costs of both State and National Governments
attendant upon unemployment, welfare and crime. 6'
So said Justice Powell in concluding his concurrence with the
majority opinion holding § 21.031 unconstitutional. Philosophically
the argument is hardly rebuttable, and in fact Chief Justice Burger,
in dissent, opened with a concession that as a matter of public
policy, he agreed with the Court.
166
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, first dis-
pelled the state's argument that undocumented aliens are not en-
titled to the benefits of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The argument was that by its own terms-" 'No state
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws"- the amendment precluded undocumented aliens
because they were not "persons within the jurisdiction" of the state
due to their unlawful immigration status. 67 The Court pointed out
that undocumented aliens have been deemed to be persons under
the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments,
68
and given the literal readings of the amendment, the undocumented
aliens were physically present within the boundaries of Texas and
subject to the laws thereof. 1 9 However, in finding that the equal
protection clause applied to undocumented aliens, the Court failed
164. See generally NOWAK, ROTUNDA AND YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
149 (Supp. 1982).
165. 457 U.S. at 241.
166. Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 210.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 212.
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to note that even though it applied, it did not elevate the status
of the undocumented alien to that of citizenship or even to the status
of the lawful resident alien.17
In determining the appropriate standard of review the Court
rejected strict scrutiny because it found that undocumented aliens
did not constitute a suspect class.' 7 Three reasons were given for
rejecting the classification as suspect. First, there was no prece-
dent for finding undocumented aliens a suspect class; second, the
class is entered voluntarily; and third, such a legislative classifica-
tion is not a "constitutional irrelevancy".*7 Instead of finding the
undocumented alien group as a whole suspect, the Court specifical-
ly identified the characteristics of the children. Justice Brennan
compared the undocumented children to the illegitimate children
who were the subject of discrimination.' 3 The analogy was drawn
that neither has any control over their status and both are free from
moral guilt."' Justice Powell's concurrence was based entirely on
the analogy of the undocumented children to illegitimates, even
though he conceded that "the analogy is not perfect." 5
Although the Court did not classify undocumented alien
children as suspect, the analogy of the discrimination created by
§ 21.031 to illegitimate children enabled the Court to review the
statute under a heightened level. 76 Although lawful resident aliens
have been granted the status of suspect class, the cases of Mathews
v. Diaz, Foley v. Connelie and Ambach v. Norwick, discussed
previously, indicate that alienage is a suspect class only when a
majority of the Justices want to overturn the statute under review.
By overturning § 21.031 the Court has placed undocumented alien
classifications on a level higher than lawful aliens in some cases.
Furthermore, the analogy of undocumented children to il-
legitimate children was, indeed, "not perfect" First and foremost,
there was no federal statute making the presence of illegitimate
children illegal. To the contrary, they are vested with full citizen-
170. "Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resi-
dent diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share
in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its
guests." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
171. 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 220.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 238.
176. "But more is involved in this case than the abstract question whether § 21.031 discriminates
against a suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right. Section 21.031 imposes a
lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status .... Section
21.031 can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State."
Id. at 223-24. See supra text accompanying note 139.
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ship rights, including the right to participate in the political pro-
cess. Second, the cases of Labine v. Vincent, Lalli v. Lalli, Mathews
v. Lucas and Fiallo v. Bell demonstrate that illegitimate children
are not always afforded a heightened level of review.
Having disposed of the classification problems, the opinion
then focused on the fundamental rights branch of the equal pro-
tection analysis. Relying on the holding of San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez, Justice Brennan appeared to
terminate any speculation that education could be deemed a fun-
damental right.177 However, Justice Marshall, in a concurring opi-
nion, joined the opinion of the Court but expressly reiterated the
view that education should be regarded as a constitutionally pro-
tected fundamental right."7 8 Justice Blackmun also wrote a con-
curring opinion focusing primarily on education and the issue of
fundamental rights. At the outset, Justice Blackmun stated that he
joined the opinion in Rodriguez holding that fundamental rights
are those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution"7 9
However, he then compared the right to an education to the
recognized fundamental right to vote. He stated, "In a sense, then,
denial of an education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote.
The former relegates the individual to second class social status;
the latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage."'
80
Therefore, it is apparent that in this case education, though not
"explicitly or implicitly" a fundamental right, was equated to a
fundamental right by at least two Justices. Justice Blackmun at-
tempted to harmonize this view with Rodriguez, which made a
distinction between relative and absolute deprivation of education.''
However, the author of Rodriguez, Justice Powell, did not men-
tion this distinction in his concurring opinion, nor did the ma-
jority opinion.
As argued previously, for education to be elevated to a higher
degree of protection than subsistence needs and housing seems
to be unsound as constitutional precedent. Furthermore, Justice
Blackmun's analogy of education to voting overlooks the fact that
the denial of education in this case is the result of the same infir-
mity that denies aliens, legal as well as illegal, the right to vote;
177. 457 U.S. at 22 1. However, the majority opinion adds that education is not "merely some
govenmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." Id. This
statement apparently removes the case from the deferential socioeconomic mode of review.
178. Id. at 230 (Marshall, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 231 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 235 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
181. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 108.
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specifically, there is a valid distinction between citizenship and
non-citizenship. Obviously, no non-citizen can vote, even though
voting has been elevated to the status of a specially protected fun-
damental right.
In the majority opinion Justice Brennan explicitly recognized
the middle level of review and included a footnote to define the
nature of the situation calling for such review:
This technique of 'intermediate' scrutiny permits us to evaluate the rationality
of the legislative judgment with reference to well-settled constitutional prin-
ciples .... Only when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be
clearly ascertained from the Constitution and our cases do we employ this
standard to aid us in determining the rationality of the legislative choice."8 2
This statement begs the question as to whether this case amounts
to a matter that is "clearly ascertained from the Constitution" and
"sufficiently absolute' The different holdings and rationales in the
state, district and circuit courts, along with a 5 to 4 vote in the
Supreme Court, suggest that the case does not fall into the category.
Although the Court's terminology recognizes three levels of
scrutiny, reduced to simplest terms there are in fact only two levels
of review. One mode of review allows a classification to stand,
while the other mode overturns classifications. Viewed in this
perspective, the undocumented alien child has a greater right to
an education than a lawful alien and a citizen have to basic sub-
sistence welfare and housing.
The majority opinion recognized and refuted the state's prin-
cipal argument: "the undocumented status of these children vel
non establishes a sufficient rational basis for denying them benefits
that a state might choose to afford other residents"'83
The Court's counter-argument was that the federal government
has complete control over immigration and naturalization and the
states are powerless to classify aliens unless such classification
"mirrors federal objectives. "'8  The argument continued that the
Court was "reluctant to impute" any Congressional intent that would
deny undocumented aliens education while they are in the
country."8 5 The Court admitted that such a classification might be
permissible in other contexts, but because of the "special constitu-
tional sensitivity" 18 of this case, the classification could not stand
182. Id. at 218 n.16.
183. Id. at 224.
184. Id. at 225.
185. id. at 226.
186. Id.
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because a substantial state interest was not promoted. 87 The
paradox of the Court's sensing a need to "impute" intent can be
seen by the gross inconsistency of finding undocumented aliens
entitled to some form of governmental largesse when their mere
presence is a crime and they are subject to deportation if
apprehended.
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion did not mention the un-
documented status of the children at all, while Justice Blackmun
conceded that it seemed "ironic" to consider the validity of the
claim.188 However, five of the Justices have decided that the fact
of a continuing presence of undocumented aliens outweighs any
educational discrimination based on a federal law that makes their
presence illegal.
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion is uncharacteristically
indicting. In summing up the holding of the Court he stated, "[W]e
are told little more than that the level of scrutiny employed to strike
down the Texas law applies only when illegal alien children are
deprived of a public education. If ever a court was guilty of an
unabashedly result-oriented approach, this case is a prime exam-
ple,""' The Chief Justice argued that the classification was rationally
based upon both a legitimate state interest and the mere un-
documented status established by federal policy."' He also pointed
out that the Court was attempting to provide "effective leadership"
where Congress had failed to established clear guidelines.' As
noted previously, philosophically the Chief Justice agreed that the
children should be educated, but he argued that there was a
"trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under
our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume
a policy making role as the Court does today."' 2
CONCLUSION
In overturning § 21.031 the Court appears to have become an
"omnipotent and omniscient problem solver"' 3 in order to arrive
187. Id. at 230. The interests of the state were: (1) The undocumented status vel non is enough
to deny state largesse. Id. at 224. (2) Maintain fiscal resources for lawful residents. Id. at 227.
(3) Attempt to reduce the number of illegal immigrants into the state. Id. at 228. (4) The un-
documented aliens' presence lowers the quality of education in the public schools. Id. at 229.
(5) The undocumented aliens are not likely to remain in the state after they have received the
education. Id. at 229-30.
188. Id. at 235.
189. Id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 251 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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at a philosophically sound result. However, it is not the Supreme
Court's role in the democratic process to promulgate philosophical-
ly sound public policy. This is evident in those cases where the
Court has deferred to legislation involving inadequate housing and
subsistence welfare. Even education was handed a defeat in the
Rodriguez decision. With the historic deference the Court has af-
forded this type of legislation, although morally and philosophically
unsound by some standards, the Court has realized that it does
not provide the remedy to all basic public inequities. Therefore,
the interventionist posture in Plyler does not seen harmonious with
prior cases where a certain amount of "constitutional sensitivity"
could be found although the equal protection challenges were
denied.
Two reasons can be advanced to support nonintervention in
cases such as Plyler where it appears that the Court's reasoning
is based on policy rather than a strict interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment. First, undercutting legislative action tends to
reduce the chances of legislative introspection that may result in
remedies to inequities a legislature may have created. Chief Justice
Burger argued that when the Court intervenes, it deprives the
political process of an opportunity to exercise its powers, and "those
powers, like muscles not used, tend to atrophy." 19 Secondly, the
Court's power is derived in part from its "moral sanction,'19 and
therefore public respect is essential. The apparent inconsistencies
noted previously may have created uncertainty and unpredicabili-
ty of law. The trend in equal protection analysis of expanding the
classifications that receive a meaningful level of review via an in-
termediate standard has produced many of the inconsistencies. The
intermediate scrutiny test appears to vacillate with each case and
the decisions are rarely unanimous. To maintain its "moral sanc-
tion," the Court must not allow an amorphous equal protection
analysis technique to result in diminished public confidence.
Charles D. Porter
194. ld. at 253 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
195. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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